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ABSTRACT
Thispaperdevelops atwo—region,two—sectorgeneral
equilibriunmodeloflocation.Thelocationofagricultural
production is fixed, but ionopolistcally competitive manufacturing
finns choose their location to maximize profits. If transportation
costs are high, returns to scale weak, and the share of spending
on manufactured goods low, the incentive to produce close to the
market leads to an equal division of manufacturing between the
regions. With lower transport costs, stronger scale economies, or
a higher manufacturing share, circular causation sets in: the more
manufacturing is located in one region, the larger that region's
share of demand, and this provides an incentive to locate still
more manufacturing there. Thus when the parameters of the economy
lie even slightly on one side of a critical "phase boundary", all
manufacturing production ends up concentrated in only one region.
Paul Krugman
Departmentof Economics
MIT
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge,MA 02139
(617)253-2655The study ofeconomicgeography --ofthelocationoffactorsof
production in space -occupiesa relatively small part ofstandardeconomic
analysis. International trade theory,inparticular,conventionallytreats
nations as dimensionless points (and frequentlyassumeszerotransportation
costs between countries as well). Adnittedly, models descended from von Thünen
play an important roleinurbanstudies,whileHotelling-ty-pemodelsof
locational competition get a reasonabledegreeofattentioninindustrial
organization. On the whole, however, it seems fair to say thatthestudyof
economic geography plays at best a marginal role in economic theory.
On the faceofit,thisneglectissurprising.The facts of
economic geography are surely among the most striking featuresofreal-world
economies, at least to laymen. For example, one of the most remarkablethings
about the United States is that in agenerallysparselypopulatedcountry,
much of whose land is fertile, the bulk of the populationresidesinafew
clustersofmetropolitanareas;fortypercentarecrowdedintoanot
especially inviting section of the East Coast. It has oftenbeennotedthat
nighttime satellite photos of Europe reveal littleofpoliticalboundaries,
but clearly suggest a center-periphery pattern whose hub issoniewhereinor
near Belgium. A laynian might have expected that these facts would playakey
role in economic modelling.
Furthermore, there is a long ifsomewhatthintraditioninlocation
theory, that one mighthavesupposedwouldinspiretheeffortsofboth
theorists and econometricians. Indeed,severalschoolsofthoughtnaybe
identified. Best known, perhaps, is the German School, originating in the work
of von Thünen (1826) butledinthetwentiethcenturybyWeber(1909),
Christaller (1933), and Lösch (1940). Inspired by this German school, but less
preoccupied with the geometry of location, was the American school of regional
science, including Hoover (1948) andespeciallyIsard(1956).Yetanother
1tradition, drawing on Marshall's initial description of agglomerationdueto
external economies, stresses the role of externalities in producingdivergent
regional development; the most influentialwritingsinthistraditionare
those of Myrdal (1957),Hirschmann(1958),andPerroux(1950),andthis
tradition has been carried on more recently by David (1984) and Arthur (1989).
Economic geography, then,is both an important subject and one thathas
at least occasionally drawn sustained attention. Yet it is largely ignoredby
theeconomicsprofession.Why?Theanswerseemsclearly to lie in
considerations of method. The interesting questions of economic geographyare
not easily addressed by the modelofcompetitivegeneralequilibriumthat
increasingly came to dominate economic thinking between 1940 and the 1970s. If
we ask why so much of the American economy is concentrated inafewcoastal
strips, we are immediately driventospeakabouteconomiesofscaleand
externalities. Yet economiesofscaleinternaltofirmsimplyimperfect
competition, which until recently wasregardedastoodifficulttomodel
rigorously,whilepurelytechnologicalexternal economies seemboth
itnplausible and too elusive to have useful empirical content.Theresultis
that discussions of economic geography have historically tended to rely either
on logically incomplete models or on verbal discussion in which models areat
best implicit. As standards of rigor rose over time, and asthoseeconomists
who wrote about geographical issues failed to keepup,theirworkandthe
subject as a whole was simply submerged.
This crowding out of important but poorly formalized insights in economic
geography is reniniscent of what happened in several other areas of economics.
Most notably,ininternationaltradetheinsightsofsuchthinkersas
Burenstam Linder (1961), Vernon (1966), and even of important partsofOhlin
were increasingly neglected as a rigorous general equilibrium approachbecame
de rigeur; while in development economics the same happened totheideasof
2such authors as Young (1928) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). Inbothtradeand
development,however,recentapplicationsofnewmodelsderived from
industrial organization have begun to restore the prominence of theseearlier
ideas. In trade, the "new international economics" of suchauthorsasDixit
and Norman (1980), Krugman (1979), and Helpman (1981)hasgivenrigor,and
hence respectability, to non-comparative-advantage explanations oftrade.In
development economics, the "new growth theory" of Romer(1986,1987),Lucas
(1988), and of Murphy, Shleifer,andVishny(1989a,1989b)hasbegunto
accomplish the same thing.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that applicationofmodelsand
techniques derivedfromtheoreticalindustrialorganizationnowallowa
reconsideration of economic geography; that itisnowtimetoattemptto
incorporate the insights of the long but informal tradition in this areainto
formal models. In order tomakethepoint,thepaperdevelopsasimple
illustrative model designed to shed light ononeofthekeyquestionsof
location: why and when does manufacturing become concentrated in a few
regions, leaving others relatively undeveloped?
What we will see is that it is possible to develop a very simple model of
regional divergence based ontheinteractionofeconomiesofscalewith
transportation costs. This is perhaps not too surprising, given thekindsof
results that have been emerging in recentliterature(withMurphyet.al.
perhaps the closest parallel). More interestingisthefactthatregional
divergence need not always happen, and that whetheritdoesdependsinan
interesting way on a few key parameters. These parametersdefineasortof
"phase boundary"; the geography of economies that lieononesideofthat
boundary will evolve in a fundamentally different way from thatofeconomies
that lie on the other side.
The paper is in five parts.Thefirstpartsetsthestagewithan
3informal discussion of the problem. The second then setsouttheanalytical
model. In the third part we analyze the determination of short-run equilibrium
and dynamics. The fourth section analyzes the conditions under whichregional
divergence does and does not occur. Finally, the paper concludes with abrief
discussion of some natural extensions.
1. for regional divergence
Whyisso much of the population of the US concentrated along500miles
of the East Coast? The standard answer is "external economies". At somelevel
this must be right; yet as it stands the answer is unsatisfying, because it is
too vague and leaves too many questions hanging. What is the nature of these
externalities? Hownecessaryisthegeographicalconcentrationtotheir
realization? How different would either history ortechnologyhavetohave
been for the great American megalopolis either not to exist or to,belocated
somewhere else? Without more specificity these questionscannotusefullybe
posed.
I will adopt the working assumption that the externalities that sometimes
lead to regional divergence are vecuniarv externalities associated with either
demand or supply linkages, rather thanpurelytechnologicalspillovers.In
competitive general equilibrium, of course, pecuniaryexternalitieshaveno
welfare significance and could not lead to the kind of interesting dynamics we
will derive later. Over the past decade, however, ithasbecomeafamiliar
point that in the presence of imperfect competitionandincreasingreturns,
pecuniary externalities matter --forexample, thatifonefirm's actions
affect the demand for the product of another firm whose price exceeds marginal
cost, this is as much a "realexternality as if one firm'sR&Dspillsover
4into the general knowledge pool. At the same time, by focussingonpecuniary
externalities we are able to make the analysis much more concrete thanifwe
allowedexternaleconomiestoariseinsomeinvisibleform(this is
particularly true when location is at issue:howfardoesatechnological
spillover spill?).
To understand the nature of the postulated pecuniaryexternalities,it
is useful to retrace some of the steps ofthegrandtraditioninlocation
theory. Weber (1909), though best known forhis"locationtriangles",also
laid out a general view of the evolution of a pattern of location in a nation.
He thought of this as involving the sequential layingdownofaseriesof
"strata", increasingly divorced from the distributionofnaturalresources.
The first stratum would consist of farmers, miners, etc.. whose location would
be determined by the distribution of arablelandandotherresources.One
might idealize the distibution of this first stratum by imagining it uniformly
spread across a featureless plain. The second stratum wouldconsistofless
locationally bound activities designed to service the first stratum --market
towns, manufacturing activities, and so on. Because oftransportationcosts,
the second stratum's location would tend to follow that of the first;because
of economies ofscale,however,itwould notbeunifor1y distributed.
Instead, it would form a sort of lattice across the plain. There would then be
a third stratum of activities servicing thesecondstratum,andforminga
sparser lattice, and so on.
Two latsr authorselaboratedthesebasicscheme.Christaller(1933)
argued that the lattices of thesecond,third,etc.stratawouldforma
hierarchy of centralplaces,whosenumberwoulddecreasebutpopulation
increase as one went up the scale. Christallerdocumentedtheexistenceof
such a hierarchy in southern Germany. Lösch (1940), in a famouscontribution,
pointed out that if the objective was to minimize transportationcosts,thenthe lattice of central places on a featureless plain would formaseriesof
hexagonal market areas.
Thit is this scheme right? Isard (1956) pointed outakeyproblemwith
Weber's view, and hence with the Christaller-Loschextensions.According
to the Weberian story, the second stratum exists toservicethefirst,the
third to service the second, and so on. However, some of thedemandforthe
second stratum's services will come, not from the first stratum, but frotnthe
second and higher strata themselves. This immediately raisesthepossibility
of a process of circular causation: the location of higher stratadependson
the distribution of demand, but the distributionofdemanddependsonthe
location of higher strata.
The circularity become still worse ifonetakesintoaccountanother
factor: it will, other things equal, be more desirabletoliveandproduce
near a central place high in the hierarchy,becauseitwillthanbeless
expensive to buy the goods and services this central place provides.
The circularity will not matter too much if the higher strata employ only
a small fraction of the population and hence generate only a small fraction of
demand; or if a combination of weak economies of scale and high transportation
costs induce suppliers of goods and services to the lowest stratumtolocate
very close to their markets. These criteria would havebeensatisfiedina
pre-railroad, pre-industrialsociety,suchasthatofsixteenth-century
Europe. In such a society the bulk of the population would havebeenengaged
in agricultur.; the small manufacturing and comiiiercial sector wouldnothave
been marked byverysubstantialeconomiesofscale;andthecostsof
transportation would have ensured that most of the needsthatcouldnotbe
satisfied by rural production wouldbesatisfied bysmalltownsserving
roughly hexagonal market areas.
Bit now let the society become richer,sothatahigherfractionof
6income is spent on non-agricultural goods and services; let the factory system
and eventually mass production emerge, and with them economies oflarge-scale
production;andletcanals,railroads,andfinally automobiles lower
transportation costs. Then the tie of production to the distributionofland
will be broken. A region with a relatively large nonrural populationwillbe
an attractive place to produce both because ofthelargelocalmarketand
because of the availability of the goods andservicesproducedthere;this
will attract still more population, at the expenseofregionswithsmaller
initial production; and the process will feed on itself until the whole of the
nonrural population is concentrated in a few regions.
Therearetwointerestingpointssuggestedby this imaginary
history. First, it seems that small changes in the parameters oftheeconomy
may have large effects on its qualitative behavior. That is, whensomeindex
that takes into account transportation costs,economiesofscale,andthe
share of nonagricultural goods in expenditure crosses acriticalthreshhold,
population will start to concentrate and regionstodiverge;oncestarted.
this process will feed on itself. Thus the geography will go through a kind of
change of state when the index crosses a critical level, much as water changes
its qualitative behavior when the temperature goes from a littleabovetoa
little below freezing.
Second, the details of the geography that emerges •- whichregions end up
with the population --dependsensitively on initial conditions. If one region
has slightly aor. population than another when, say, transportation costs fall
below some critical level, that region ends up gainingpopulationatthe
other's expense; had the distribution of population atthatcriticalmoment
been only slightly different,therolesoftheregionsmighthavebeen
reversed. Again to use a physical analogy, this is a "random broken synimetry":
like ice crystallizing as water is cooled, the detailed structuredependson
7possibly small accidents of early history.
This is about as far as an informal story can take us. The nextstepis
to develop as simple as possible a formal model, to see whether the story just
told can be given a more rigorous formulation.
2. A two-region model
We begin, for simplicity, with a model of tworegions(a many-region
model is considered in the last section). In this model there areassumedto
be two kinds of production: agriculture, which isaconstant-returnssector
tied to the land, and manufactures, an increasing-returns sector thatcanbe
located in either region.
The model, like many of the models in both thenewtradeandthenew
growthliterature, is avariantonthemonopolisticcompetition
framework initially proposed by Dixit andStiglitz(1977).Thisframework,
while admittedly special, is remarkablypowerfulinitsabilitytoyield
simple intuition-building treatments of seemingly intractableissues.
All individuals in this economy, then, are assumed toshareautility
function of the form
U —
whereCA is consumption of the agricultural good and CM isconsumptionofa
manufactures aggregate. Given (1), of course, manufactures will always receive
a share p of expenditure; this share is one of the keyparametersthatwill
determine whether regions converge or diverge.
The manufactures aggregate CM is defined byCM -(E(al)/c)c/(cl) (2)
where N is the large number of potential products and c>l is the elasticity of
substitution among the products. The elasticitycisthesecondparameter
determining the character of equilibrium in the model.
There are two regions in the economy, and two factorsofproductionin
each region. Following the simplification suggested inKrugman(1981),each
factor is assumed specific to one sector. Peasants produce agricultural goods;
without loss of generality we suppose that the unit labor requirement isone.
The peasant population is assumed completely immobile between regions, witha
given peasant supply (l-/A)/2 in each region.Workersmaymovebetweenthe
regions; we let L1, L2 be the worker supply in regions 1 and 2,respectively,
and require only that the total add up to the overall nunber of workers
L1+L2—/A (3)
The production of an individual manufactured good i involves a fixed cost
and constant marginal cost, giving rise to economies of scale:
i—a÷fl (4)
where is the labor used in producing i and is the good's output.
We turn next to the structure of transportationcostsbetweenthe two
regions.Twostrongassuptionswillbemadefortractability.First,
1This choice of units ensures that the wage rate ofworkersequalsthatof
peasants in long-run equilibrium.
9transportation of agricultural output ii.ll k.assumed g costless.2The
effect of this sssuniption is to ensure thst the price of agricutturatoutput,
and hence the earnings of each peasant, are the same in both regions. Wewill
usethiscommonagriculturalprice/wage rate as nunieraire. Second,
transportationcostsformanufacturedgoodswillbeassumed to take
Samuelson's "iceberg" form, in which transport costs are incurred in thegood
transported. Specifically, of eachunitofmanufacturesshippedfromone
region to the other, only a fraction r<l arrives. This fraction r, which is an
inverse index of transportation costs,isthefinalparameterdetermining
whether regions converge or diverge.
We can now turn to the behavior of firms. Suppose that there are a large
number of manufacturing firms, each producing a single product. Then given the
definition of the manufacturing aggregate (2) and theassumptionoficeberg
transport costs, the elasticity of demand facing any individual firm is a (see
Krugman (1980)). The profit-maximizing pricing behaviorofarepresentative
firm in region 1 is therefore to set a price equal to
P1 —[a/(al)]flwl (5)
where w1 is the wage rate of workers in region 1. A similarequationapplies
in region 2; so comparing the prices of representative products, we have
2Thereason for this assumption is the following: since agriculturalproducts
are assumed to be homogeneous, each region is eitherexportingorimporting
them, never both. But if agricultural goodsarecostlytotransport,this
would introduce a "cliff" at thepointwherethetworegionshaveequal
numbers of workers, and thuswhereneitherhadtoimportfood.Thisis
evidently anartifactofthetwo-regioncase:ifpeasantswerespread
uniformly across a featureless plain, there would be no discontinuity.
10— w1/w2- (6)
If there is free entry offirmsintomanufacturing,profitsmustbe
driven to zero. Thus it niust be true that
—aw1 (7)
which implies
x1 —x2—a/(ci-l) (8)
That is, output per firmisthe same in each region, irrespective of wage
rates, relative demand, etc.. This has the useful implication that thenumber
of manufactured goods produced in each region is proportional to the number of
workers, so that
n1/n2 —L1/L2 (9)
It should be noted that in zero-profit equilibrium ci/(ci-l) istheratio
of the marginal product of labor to its average product, i.e., thedegreeof
economies of scale. Thus Q,althoughit is a parameter of tastesratherthan
technology, can be interepreted as an inverse index ofequilibriumeconomies
of scale. As such, itisthethirdandfinalparameterdeterminingthe
behavior of this economy.
We have now laid out the basic structure of the niodel. The nextstepis
to turn to the determination of equilibrium.
113. Short-run and long-run equilibrium
This model lacks any explicit dynamics. However, it is useful tohavea
concept of short-run equilibrium before turning to full equilibrium. Short-run
equilibrium will be defined in a Marshallian way, as an equilibriuminwhich
the allocation of workers between regions maybetakenasgiven.Wethen
suppose that workers move toward theregionthatoffersthemhigherreal
wages, leading either to convergencebetweenregionsastheymovetoward
equality of worker-peasant ratios, or divergence as the workers all congregate
in one region.
To analyze short-run equilibrium, webeginbylookingatthedemand
within each region for products of the two regions. Let c11 be the consumption
in region 1 of a representative region 1 product, and c12 betheconsumption
in region 1 of a representative region 2 product. The price of a local product
is simply its f.o.b. price p1; the price of a product from theotherregion,
however, is its transport-cost-inclusive price p2/r. Thus the relativedemand
for representative products is
c11/c12 —(p1r/p2)°—(w1r/w2)° (10)
Define z11 as the ratio of region 1 expenditure on local manufacturesto
that on manufactures fromtheotherregion.Twopointsshouldbenoted
about z. First, a one percent rise in the relative price ofregion1goods,
while reducing the relative quantity sold by a percent, will reduce the yj
by only a-l percent, because of the valuation effect. Second, themoregoods
produced in region 1, the higher their shareofexpenditureforanygiven
relative price. Thus z11 equals
12— (n1/n2)(p1r/p2)(c11/c12)—(L1/L2)(w1r/w2)° (11)
Similarly, the ratio ofregion2spendingonregion1productsto
spending on local products is
—(L1/L2)(w1/w2r)° (12)
The total income of region 1 workers is equal to thetotalspendingon
these products in both regions. (Transportationcostsareincludedbecause
they are assumed to be incurred in the goods themselves). Let Y1,Y2bethe
regional incomes (including the wages of peasants). Then the income ofregion
1 workers is
w1L1 —p([z11/(14-z11)]Y1+[z12/(l+z12)]Y2) (13)
and the income of region 2 workers is
w2L2 —p([l/(l+z11)]Y1+[l/(l+z12)Y2) (14)
The incomes of the two regions, however, depend onthedistributionof
workers and their wages. Recalling that thewagerateofpeasantsisthe
numeraire, we have
—(l-p)/2+s,1L1 (15)
"2 —(l-p)/2+w2L2 (16)
The setofequations(ll)-(16)mayberegardedasasystemthat
13determines and (as well as four other variables) given thedistribution
of labor between regions 1 and 2. By inspection, one can seethatif
w1—w2. If labor is then shifted to region 1, however, the relativewagerate
w1/w2 can move either way. The reason is that there are two opposingeffects.
On one side, there is the "home market effect": other things equal,thewage
rate will tend to be higher in the larger market (see Krugman (1980)). Onthe
other side, there is the extent of competition: workers in the region with the
smaller manufacturing labor force will facelesscompetitionfor thelocal
peasant market than those in the more populous region. In otherwords,there
is a tradeoff between proximity to the larger market and lackofcompetition
for the local market.
In moving fromshort-runtolong-runequilibrium,however,athird
consideration enters the picture.Workersareinterested,notinnominal
wages, but in real wages; and workers in the region with the larger population
will face a lower price for manufactured goods. Let f—L1/p, the shareofthe
manufacturinglaborforceinregion1.Thenthetruepriceindexof
manufactured goods for consumers residing in region 1 is
P1 -[fw°+(l-f)(w2/c)]° (17),
whilethat for consumers residing in region 2 is
P2-[f(w1/c) +(l-f)w)'° (18)
and the real wages of workers in each region are
—w1P1M (19)
14— w2P
(20)
Looking at (17)and(18), itisapparent that if wageratesinthetwo
regions are equal, a shiftof workers from region2 to region 1 willlower the
price index in region 1and raise it in region2, and thus raisereal wages in
region 1 relative to thosein region 2.Thisthereforeaddsanadditional
reason for divergence.
We may now ask thecrucial question how doesw1/w2 vary with f? Weknow
by symmetry that whenf—l/2, i.e., when the tworegions have equalnumbersof
workers, they offer equalreal wage rates. But isthis astableequilibrium?
It will be if w1/w2decreases with f; for inthat case whenever oneregion has
a larger workforce than the other,workers will tend tomigrate outofthat
region. In this case wewill get regional convergence.On the otherhand,if
increases with f, workerswill tend tomigrate theregionthat
already has more workers,and we will get regionaldivergence.3Aswehave
seen, there are twoforces working towarddivergence -thehome market effect
and the price indexeffect --andone working towardconvergence,thedegree
of competition for thelocal peasant's market.The questioniswhichforces
dominate.
In principle, it ispossible simply to solve ourmodel for real wagesas
a function of f.This is, however,difficult to do analytically.In thenext
section an indirectapproach is used tocharacterize the model'sbehavior. For
now, however, let ussimply note that there areonly three parameters inthis
3Strictly speaking, a dynamic story shouldtake expectations intoaccount.It
is possible that workers maymigrate into the regionthat initially hasfewer
workers, because they expectother workerstodothesame.Thiskindof
self-fulfilling prophecy canonly occur, however, ifadjustment israpidand
discount rates not too high.See Krugman (1989) for ananalysis.
15model that cannot be eliminatedby choice of units: theshareofexpenditure
on manufactured goods, p; theelasticity of substitutionamongproducts,a;
and the fraction of a goodshipped that arrives,r. And the model can be quite
easilysolvednumericallyforavarietyofparameters. Thus it is
straightforward to show that dependingon the parametervalueswemayhave
either regional convergenceor regional divergence.
Figure 1 makes the point. It showscomputed values of as a function
of f in two differentcases. In both cases we assumecz—4andp—.3.Inone
case, however, r—.5 (high transportationcosts), while in the otherr—.75 (low
transportation costs). In thehigh transport costcase, the relative realwage
declines as f rises. Thus inthiscasewewouldexpecttoseeregional
convergence, withthegeographicaldistributionofthe"secondstratum"
following that of the first.In the lowtransportcostcase,however,the
slope is reversed; thuswe would expect to see regionaldivergence.
Itispossibletoproceedentirelynumericallyfromthis point,
generating a "map" of parametervalues forwhichconvergenceordivergence
will occur. By takinga somewhat different approach,however, itispossible
to characterize the properties ofthis map analytically, andalso to develop a
simple way of computing it.
4. Convergence divergence
To ask when regions diverge,it turns out to be mostusefultoreverse
the way we approach the problem.Instead of asking whetheranequilibriumin
which workers are distributedequally between the regionsisstable,weask
whether a situation in which allworkers are concentrated inone region isan
equilibrium.
Consider a situation in whichall workers are concentratedinregion1
16(the choice of region of course is arbitrary). Region1 will then constitute a
larger market than region 2. Since a share oftotalincomepisspenton
manufactures, and all of this income goes to region1, we have
—(1-i)/(l+) (21)
Let n be the total number of manufacturingfirms;theneachfirmwill
have a of sales equal to
V1 —(l/n)(Y1+ Y2) (22)
which is just enough to allow each firm to make zeroprofits.
Now we ask: is it possible for an individual firm to commenceproduction
profitably in region 2? (I willrefertosuchahypotheticalfirmasa
"defecting firm). If not, then concentration ofproduction in region 1 isan
equilibrium; if so, it isn't.
In order to produce in region 2,a firm must be able to attractworkers.
To do so,itmustcompensatethemforthefactthatallmanufactures
(except its own infinitesimal contribution) must beimported;thuswemust
have
w2/wl -(l/ (23)
Given this higher wage, the firm will chargeaprofit-maximizingprice
that is higher than that of other firms in the sameproportion.Wecanuse
this fact to derive the valueof thefirm's sales. In region 1, thedefecting
firm's value of sales will be the value ofsalesofarepresentativefirm
times (w2/w1i) Inregion 2, its valueofsaleswillbethatofa
17representative firm times (w2r/1) --
Sothe total value of thedefecting
firms sales will be
V2 —(1/n)[(w2/w1r)UY1+(w2r/w1)Y2J (24)
Notice that transportation costs work to the firm's disadvantageinits
sales to region 1 consumers, but work to its advantage on salestoregion2
consumers (because other firms must pay them but it does not).
From (22), (23), and (24) we can (aftersomemanipulation)derivethe
ratio of the value of sales by this defecting firm to the salesoffirmsin
region 1:
V2/V1 -(l/2)ra[(l+,)r+(l,)rl)] (25)
One might think that it is profitable for a firm todefectaslongas
V2/V1>l, since firms will collect a constant fraction of any sales as a markup
over marginal costs. This is not quite right,however,becausefixedcosts
are also higher in region 2 because of the higher wage rate. So wemusthave
V2/V1>w2/w1 —r.We must therefore define a new variable,
- (26)
When w<l, it is unprofitable for a firm to begin production inregion2
if all other manufacturing production is concentrated inregion1.Thusin
thiscaseregionaldivergence isthe long-run equilibrium. Ifw>l
concentration of production in one region is not an equilibrium.
Equation (26) at first appears to be afairlyunpromisingsubjectfor
analytical results. However, it yields to careful analysis.
18First note what we want to do with (26). It defines a boundary: a serof
critital parameter values thatmarkthedivisionbetweenconvergenceand
divergence. So we need only evaluate it in the vicinity of v —1,askinghow
each of the three parameters must change in order to offset achange in either
of the others.
Let us begin, then, with the most straightforwardof theparameters,p.
We find that
ôu/ôp —vc(lnr) +(l/2)r c 0 (27)
That is, the larger the share of income spent on manufactured goods,the
lower the relative sales of the defectingfirm.Thistakesplacefortwo
reasons. First, workers demand a larger wagepremium in order to movetothe
second region; this effect is reflected in the first term. Second,thelarger
the share of expenditure on manufactures, the larger therelative size ofthe
region 1 market and hencethestrongerthehomemarketeffect.Thisis
reflected in the second term in (27).
Next we turn to transportation costs. From inspection of (26),wefirst
note that when r—l, u—i --thatis, when transport costs are zero locationis
irrelevant (no surprise!). Second, we note that when r is small, uapproaches
(l-p)r°0. Unless a is very small or p very large, this must exceed 1 for
sufficiently small r (the economics of the alternative case willbeapparent
shortly). Finally, we evaluate 8w/Or:
—pcu/r+rMC(cl)((l+p)rC(l.p)r]/2r (28)
For r close to 1, the second term in (28)dropsout,leavingonlythe
positive first term.
19Taken together, these observations indicate a shape for &'as afunction
of r that looks like Figure 2 (which represents an actual calculation for p—
.3,a —4):at low levels of r(i.e., high transportationcosts),vexceeds
one and it is profitable to defect; at some critical value of r, t'fallsbelow
one and concentrated manfacturing is an equilibrium, and the relative value of
sales then approaches 1 from below.
The important point from this picture is that at the critical value of r
that corresponds to the boundary between convergence and divergence, av/aris
negative. That is,highertransportationcostsmilitateagainstregional
divergence.
We can also now interpret the case where a(l-p)<l, so thatv<levenat
arbitrarily low r. This is a case where economies of scale are so large (small
a) and or the share of manufacturing in expenditure so high (high p)thatit
is unprofitable to start a firm in region 2 no matter how high transport costs
are.
Finally, we calculate öv/öa. This equals
8v/öa —ln(r)(pv+ (l/2)r°[(l+p)r°-(l-p)r°])
—ln(r)[tic] (öv/ör)
Since we have Just seen that öv/ör is negative attherelevantpoint,this
implies that öv/öc is positive. That is, a higher elasticityofsubstitution
(which also implies smaller economies of scale in equilibrium)worksagainst
regional divergence.
The implications of these results can be seen digrammatically. Holdinga
constant, we can draw a "phase boundary" in p,r space.Thisboundarymarks
20parameter values at which firms are justindifferentbetweenstayingin a
region-i concentration or defecting. An economy that iies inside this boundary
wiii not deveiop concentrations of industry in one or the other region,while
an economy that iles outside the boundary wiii. The siope of the boundary is
Br/Bp —-(Bw/Bp)/(ôw/Br)C0
If we instead hoid u constant and consider changing a, we find
Br/Ba —-(Bw/Ba)/(Bw/Br)>0
Thus an increase in a will shift the boundary in p,r space outward.
Figure 3 shows caicuiated boundaries in pr space for two vaiues of a, 4
and iO. The figure teiis a simpie story that is preciseiy the intuitivestory
giveninpartiofthispaper.Inaneconomycharacterizedbyhigh
transportation costs, a smaii share of footloosemanufacturing,and/orweak
economies of scaie, thedistributionofmanufacturingproductionwiiibe
determined by the distribution of the"primarystratum"ofpeasants.With
lower transportation costs, ahighermanufacturingshare,and/orstronger
economies ofscaie,circuiarcausationsetsin,andmanufacturingwiii
concentrate in whichever region gets a head start.
What is particuiariy nice about this resuit is that it requires no appeal
to eiusiveconceptsiikepuretechnoiogicaiexternaiities;theexternal
economies are pecuniary, arising fromthedesirabiiityofseiiingtoand
buying from a region inwhichotherproducersareconcentrated.Itaiso
involves no arbitrary assumptions about the geographicalextentofexternai
economies: distance enters naturaily via transportation costs, and in no other
way. The behavior of the modei depends on "observabie" features of thetastes
2iof individuals and the technology of firms;theinterestingdynamicsarise
from interaction effects.
Obviously thisisahighlyspecialmodel. Iwillnotattemptto
generalize it significantly in this paper, but there isonespecialfeature
that needs some further discussion: the assumption thatthereareonlytwo
regions.
5. Multiple rezions
The assumption of a two-region economy, while a natural first cut at this
problem,begsmanyoftheimportantquestionsoftraditionaleconomic
geography. Among the extensions one should clearly try to make is therefore an
effort to model multiple-region behavior.
In the grand tradition of economic geography one clearlyoughttodrop
the notion of regions altogether, and start fromauniformdistributionof
peasants across a featureless two-dimensional plain. I wouldargue,however,
that a premature attempt at quasi-realistic geometry has been one of the vices
of economic geography, focussingitsattentionawayfromthefundamental
economic issues. Preliminary insights can be gained withoutgoingthisfar.
Specifically, let us assume that there are several distinct regions,eachof
whichwillitselfbemodelledasapoint,andthat theworld is
one-dimensional, i.e., the regions are laid out in a line.
It will be desirable to maintain symmetry; the only way to do this isto
assume that the regions are in fact laidoutinacircle(surroundingan
impassable mountain range?). We alsowanttoconsiderasfewregionsas
possible consistent with interesting behavior; for reasonsthatwillbecome
apparent in a moment, the useful number turns out to be six.
22Consider, then,:he economy shown in Figure 4. It containssixregions,
laid outinacircle.Ithasthesametastesandtechnologyasour
two-region model. Eachregionhasone-sixthof the economy'speasant
population. Manufactures production can be carried out in any region. However,
when manufactures are shipped from one region to the next, afraction(l-r)
evaporates en route; thus if goods are shipped from, say, region 1toregion
4, only a fraction arrives.
What will long-run equilibrium look like inthismodel?Obviouslyone
possibility is that manufactures production will be evenlyspreadamongthe
six regions. A secondpossibilityisthereverse:thatallmanufactures
production will concentrate in a single "metropolis". In Figure 4, wesuppose
that region 1 becomes the metropolis, its role indicated by the shading of its
circle.
But there are now intermediate possibilities. Consider in particularthe
case illustrated in Figure 5 (ignoring the dashed arc for the moment). In this
case there is one metropolis in region 1, but a second one in region4.Each
of these metropolises has a "hinterland" of two rural regions: while they will
sell manufactures into each other's hinterland, each will have a larger market
share in the local area.
Evidently which kind of equilibrium develops depends on the parametersof
the economy. Very low transport costs, etc., will lead to thecaseshownin
Figure 4; very high costs to a dispersedmanufacturingsector;intermediate
parameters to an intermediate case.
This is still only a caricature of realistic economic geography,butit
is already rich enough to shed some interesting new light on an oldquestion.
What are the effects of economic integration, especially when a smallcountry
integrates withalargeone?Neoclassicaleconomistshavetraditionally
invoked the idea of gains from trade in both goods and factors, while critics,
23from Graham (1923) on, have worried that the small country will be crowded our
of increasingreturnssectors.Thediscussionhasbeenmadevagueand
confusing by both uncertainty about how to model increasing returns, and about
theextenttowhichexternaleconomiesarenational as opposed to
international in scope.
The model sketched out here suggests a new wayofthinkingaboutthis
issue. A small country does not, in general,consistofsmallregions;it
consists of a￿L&L regions. When itintegrateswithalargereconomy,the
question is how these new regions fit into the emergent economic geography.
Consider Figure 5 again. Suppose that thesixregionsconsistoftwo
countries --onecomprising regions 1,2,5,6, the othercomprisingregions 3
and 4. (The broken line indicatestheborder).Wesupposeinitiallythat
political restrictions on trade and factor mobility are sufficientthateach
economy's regional structure evolves independently.Specifically,thelarge
country develops a metropolis in region 1, while thesmallcountrydevelops
one in region 4.
Now suppose that the countries engage in a "1992" thatremovesbarriers
to trade and factor mobility. What will happen? There aretwopossibilities.
One is the Graham case, or the Canadian nightmare: thelargermetropolisat
region 1 attracts all manufacturing to itself,leavingthesmallercountry
entirely rural. The other is that the case shown in Figure 5, rather than that
in Figure 4,is the equilibrium. In that casethesmallcountrymetropolis
actually exDands as a result of integration, as it gains accesstoitsfull
natural hinterland.
This is hardly a complete analysis; but it suggests that many issues that
are currently framed as issues of international trade should instead be viewed
as issues of regional economics and economic geography.
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